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The paper uses the concept of typicality to spell out an argument against
Humean supervenience and the best system account of laws. It proves that,
in a very general and robust sense, almost all possible Humean worlds have
no Humean laws. They are worlds of irreducible complexity that do not allow
for any systematization. After explaining typicality reasoning in general, the
implications of this result for the metaphysics of laws are discussed in detail.
1 What are laws of nature?
Over the past few decades, the best system account has developed into a popular, maybe
even the dominant position regarding the metaphysics of laws of nature. In brief, this
view holds that laws of nature are merely descriptive, an efficient summary of contingent
regularities that we find in the world. Metaphysically, it is based on the thesis of Humean
supervenience – named in honor of David Hume’s denial of necessary connections – that
David Lewis (1986b) famously characterized as “the doctrine that all there is to the
world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then
another.” Laws of nature are then supposed to supervene on this Humean mosaic as the
deductive system that strikes the optimal balance between simplicity and informativeness
in describing the world.
The Humean “regularity view” of laws is opposed to the “governing view,” in its var-
ious forms, according to which the fundamental laws play an active role in guiding, or
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producing, or constraining the history of the universe. For our discussion (and avoid-
ing a complete overview of the various anti-Humean positions), I will take the main
contemporary contenders to be dispositional essentialism (Bird, 2007) – which grounds
the laws of nature in dispositional properties instantiated by the fundamental entities –
and nomic primitivism (Maudlin, 2007a), which admits “law of nature” as a primitive
ontological category, and laws as fundamental entities into the ontology of the world.
Our discussion will only be concerned with fundamental physical laws that govern or
summarize the entire physical history of the world, although both Humean and anti-
Humean views may be compatible with more deflationary notions of lawhood.1 On
the other hand, I am only going to defend the minimal anti-Humean thesis that laws
“govern” or “constrain” that history. If the view that laws “produce” entails more than
that (as Schaffer (2016) argues) or is tied to a particular metaphysics of time (see Loewer
(2012) versus Maudlin (2007a)), it will require additional justification.
There is one way to phrase the debate between Humeans and anti-Humeans that I find
both uninteresting and misleading (for reasons that will become clearer in the course
of our discussion): Laws can determine regularities (as their instances), and regularities
can determine laws (as their best systematization), and so one may ask: What comes
first, what is more fundamental, the regularities or the laws? (“What grounds what?”
is how one would put it, more properly, in contemporary metaphysics, see, e.g., Schaffer
(2008, 2009).) One might then be skeptical about one of these two grounding relations
and choose sides on this basis; e.g., deny that there can ever be an unambiguously best
system, or find it utterly mysterious how laws are supposed to “govern” anything. This
is not my main concern, however, and my discussion will grant that both the regularity
and the governing view of laws are at least conceptually sound. Instead, I consider the
debate between Humean and anti-Humean metaphysics to be first and foremost a debate
about fundamental ontology – whether there is more to the fabric of the world than the
Humean mosaic – and the interesting choice to be one between ontological parsimony
and other theoretical virtues.
In this debate, Humeans have had remarkable success in defending a prima facie
implausible position against all objections that have been thrown its way (and then
claim victory on the grounds of parsimony). In recent years, criticisms of the best
system account have focussed, in particular, on the lack of explanatory power of Humean
laws (e.g., Maudlin (2007a); Lange (2013)), the alleged subjectivity of the best system
(Armstrong, 1983; Carroll, 1994), or the commitment to a separable ontology which
is put into question by the entanglement structure of quantum mechanics (Maudlin,
1Maudlin’s view according to which laws produce the history of the universe is arguably not.
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2007a). Humeans have resisted all of these attacks with some, though varying, degree
of persuasiveness (see, e.g., Lewis (1994); Loewer (1996, 2012); Cohen and Callender
(2009); Hall (2009), for the application of Humeanism to (Bohmian) quantum mechanics
see Esfeld et al. (2014); Esfeld (2014); Miller (2014); Callender (2015); Bhogal and Perry
(2017)). This is not to say that the objections have no merit, but I believe they have not
quite managed to capture the implausibility of Humean metaphysics and turn it into a
compelling argument for modal realism.
The present paper aims to do just that. It will thereby elaborate on a fairly common
anti-Humean intuition, which is to look at the astonishing order in our cosmos, the
uniformity of nature expressed by the simple and successful laws discovered in physics,
and ask: how likely is it that these regularities come about by chance?
One place where this argument articulated in some detail is in the book “The Divine
Lawmaker” by John Foster (2004) (for a more recent discussion along these lines, see
Filomeno (2019)):
What is so surprising about the situation envisaged – the situation in which
things have been gravitationally regular for no reason – is that there is a
certain select group of types, such that (i) these types collectively make up
only a tiny portion of the range of possibilities, so that there is only a very
low prior epistemic probability of things conforming to one of these types
when outcomes are left to chance ... (Foster, 2004, p. 68)
I agree with the basic intuition but believe that the argument, thus phrased, cannot
succeed. Indeed, Humeans have several good points to make in response:
1. We do not have to account for why the law of gravitation – or any other particular
law described by physics – holds in our universe. Anti-Humean views don’t explain
this, either. The debate is about what it is to be a law, not why the laws of our
world are what they are.
2. What do you mean by “chance”? The thesis of Humean supervenience holds
that the history of the universe, the distribution of “local particular facts”, is
contingent. But contingency, or the absence of a further metaphysical ground, does
not mean randomness. In fact, Humean metaphysics are opposed to all intuitions
about the mosaic being “produced” by a chancy process – particles performing
random motions, or God playing blindfolded darts and throwing local particulars
into spacetime, or anything like that.
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3. Where do your “prior probabilities” come from? What determines the right prob-
ability measure over possible worlds? All successful applications of probability
theory come from within science. And according to the most prominent Humean
account (Lewis, 1994; Loewer, 2001, 2004; Albert, 2015), the fundamental prob-
ability measure that grounds probabilistic predictions and rational priors is itself
part of the best system that supervenes on the Humean mosaic. In other words:
the actual world determines all relevant probabilities; there are no justified a priori
probabilities which could warrant the conclusion that a world like ours is unlikely.
These points are well taken. In particular, I agree that references to probability or chance
are dubious in a metaphysical context where subjectivist, frequentist, and regularity
interpretations all seem questionable or inappropriate. There exists, however, a different
concept that has recently gained increased attention in the philosophical literature and
strikes me as a perfect fit for the issue at hand. That is the concept of typicality (see,
e.g., Goldstein (2001, 2012); Bricmont (2001); Volchan (2007); Lazarovici and Reichert
(2015); Maudlin (2007b, 2020); on the differences between typicality and probability,
see, in particular, Wilhelm (2019)).
1.1 Typicality
The basic idea is simple: A property P is typical within a reference class W if almost
all members of W instantiate P . The property is atypical within W if ¬P is typical.
If P is typical within W , it is also commonly said (with a slight abuse of language)
that a typical member of W has the property P .
Why does typicality avoid the objections raised against probability? For one, because
typicality statements are extremely robust against variations of the measure used to
quantify subsets of W , so much so that, in most cases, the question how to pick the
right measure or what it even means to be the “right” measure doesn’t even arise (cf.
Maudlin (2007b, p. 286)).
A paradigmatic example of a typicality statement is: almost all real numbers are
irrational. That is, being irrational is typical within the set R of reals.
In what sense is this true? First and foremost, in terms of cardinalities. The set of real
numbers is uncountably infinite, while the subset of rational numbers is only countably
infinite. Therefore, |Q||R| = 0. This is a very precise and generally uncontroversial sense
in which almost all real numbers are irrational. In principle, nothing more needs to
be said here. However, since we will use it later on – and since its more familiar from
applications in physics – we can spell out typicality in terms of a measure in the sense of
mathematical measure theory. It then seems natural to consider the uniform Lebesgue
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measure on R, which makes it true that all real numbers except for a subset of measure
zero are irrational.2 Note that the Lebesgue measure on R is not normalizable, so it
cannot be confused with a probability measure. But maybe the uniform measure is
suspicious as it reeks too much of a “principle of indifference”. Fair enough, we can
pick virtually any other measure we like. Any non-discrete measure, i.e., any measure
that is zero on singletons, will agree that Q ⊂ R has measure zero. (By σ-additivity, a
measure can only be non-zero on countable sets if it is non-zero on some one-element
sets.) Simply put, we assume nothing more than that a one-element subset is vanishingly
small compared to an uncountably infinite set. There is thus a very innocent and intuitive
sense in which all reasonable measures agree on the meaning of “typical”.
Notably, typicality statements in physics usually admit exception sets of very small
(but positive) measure. This introduces a certain vagueness and requires tighter restric-
tions on typicality measures, leading to some debate about their justification. Here and
in our following discussion, we can use a very strict standard of typicality, which provides
much stronger results than can be realistically obtained in physics and for which these
issues do not seriously arise.
Another crucial difference between typicality and probability is that typicality is not
tied to ignorance, randomness, or indeterminism. It is an objective, determinate fact
that typical real numbers are irrational. It has nothing to do with anyone’s credences,
nor with some number being picked at random, or picked out at all.
When applied to a reference class of possible worlds, typicality figures in a way of rea-
soning about contingency. (And contingency, if anything, is central to Humean meta-
physics.) If a fact about the world is contingent, it means that it could have been
different. But not all contingent facts are equally surprising or counterfactually robust
or deserving of an explanation. Some facts stand out in that they make our world very
special. Some facts could have been different but only if God – metaphorically speaking
– had meticulously arranged things in the world to make it so. Recently, several papers
have explored how typicality facts can ground explanations, predictions, and rational
believes, both in everyday life and in the context of fundamental physics and statistical
mechanics. We will expand on some of this in the course of our discussion and argue, in
particular, that typicality extends to a powerful way of reasoning in metaphysics.
The typicality fact that the best system account has to deal with is then the following:
It is typical for Humean worlds to have no Humean laws. Almost all Humean worlds do
not have any regularities in the first place but are too complex to allow for a complete
2This is weaker than the statement in terms of cardinalities; all countable sets have Lebesgue measure
zero, but not Lebesgue null-sets are countable.
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systematization. (This will be rigorously proven for deterministic laws and in a more
hand-waving fashion for probabilistic ones.) The challenge to Humean metaphysics is
thus not to account for why we find these particular laws in our universe, but why we
find any laws at all. Conversely, if we do live in a world that is regular enough to be
described by physical laws, the best explanation is the existence of something in the
fundamental ontology that makes it so.
In the next section, we will clarify the relevant reference class of the above typicality
statement. Section 3 will then discuss typicality as a way of reasoning in science and
metaphysics, i.e., the normative implications of typicality facts. Section 4 will provide a
detailed discussion and proof of the typicality result that almost all Humean worlds have
no laws. Section 5 will address the question, in what sense anti-Humean metaphysics do
and do not fare better in explaining the lawfulness of our world.
2 Ontological possibility
The orthographical symbols are twenty-five in number. This finding made it
possible, three hundred years ago, to formulate a general theory of the Library
and solve satisfactorily the problem which no conjecture had deciphered: the
formless and chaotic nature of almost all the books.
— Jorge Luis Borges, The Library of Babel
While typicality statements, at least when made with respect to an infinite reference set,
require some mathematical tool like measures to give precise meaning to the locution
“almost all”, their truth-maker – and what is ultimately doing the explanatory work –
is not the measure but the reference class with respect to which properties come out as
typical or atypical (or neither). In particular, an important – if not the most important
– way in which physical laws, however conceived, explain or predict, is by delimiting a
set of nomologically possible worlds that makes certain physical phenomena typical.
Indeed, we learned with the breakthrough of atomism and the development of sta-
tistical mechanics that, due to the huge number of microscopic degrees of freedom,
the fundamental dynamical laws allow for vast possibilities far beyond what had been
thought permissible by natural laws (cf. Albert (2015, Ch.1)). That apples fall to the
ground but don’t jump up, that planets do not suddenly fly off their orbit (while emitting
an ultra-fast particle in the opposite direction), and heaps of dust do not spontaneously
transform into dinosaurs, is explained not by the fact that such events are nomologically
impossible but by the fact that they are atypical, i.e., that they would require extremely
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special micro-conditions (of the universe, in the last resort).3
The modality involved here can be understood in a largely semantic manner, indepen-
dent of metaphysical commitments. The content of a physical law (I am referring here
primarily to dynamical ones) corresponds, first and foremost, to the modal space carved
out by the law. And then there are certain features common to almost all possible solu-
tions (at least given certain macroscopic boundary conditions), while most phenomena
that we would consider as falsifying instances are not quite logically incompatible with
the law but realized only for atypical models of the theory.
To apply an analogous typicality reasoning in a metaphysical context – evaluating
how Humean, respectively anti-Humean metaphysics fare in accounting for the relevant
features of our world – we need a reference class of possible worlds that is determined
by the respective ontologies and does not a priori coincide with nomic possibilities. The
relevant reference class that I propose is generated as follows:
Fix the fundamental ontology of the world as postulated by a metaphysical theory,
that is, the fundamental entities with their essential properties, and consider all their
possible configurations, i.e., possible distributions of contingent properties (such as spa-
tiotemporal relations) over these “individuals”.
Possible worlds thus generated are sometimes called Wittgenstein worlds4. Allowing
for “augmentation” and “contraction” – adding individuals (but not universals) beyond
those that exist, or removing some that do – the set Wittgenstein worlds is extended to
“Armstrong worlds” (Kim, 1986) and the theory of modality known as Combinatorialism
(Armstrong (1986, 1989); see Sider (2005) for a recent discussion). In our discussion, we
will not need augmentations and contractions, and if we consider the option that laws
of nature may themselves be among the fundamental “entities” in our world, adding or
removing them would defeat the purpose. Hence, we shall keep the basic furniture of
our world fixed, both in type and in number. Notably, I am not interested in defending
this or any other version of Combinatorialism as a full-blown theory of metaphysical
possibility. Instead, let us call the relevant notion of modality ontological possibility, the
crucial point being that a world is ontologically possible (according to a metaphysical
candidate-theory) if it has the same fundamental ontology as postulated for ours.
3The easiest – but by no means only – way to construct such bizarre examples is to consider the time
reversal of entropy-increasing processes, exploiting the time-reversal invariance of the microdynamics.
4In reference to the following passage of the Tractatus:
2.0271 The object is the fixed, the existent; the configuration is the changing, the variable.
2.0272 The configuration of the objects forms the atomic fact. [...]
2.04 The totality of existent atomic facts is the world.
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Here are some examples for the use of ontological possibility: If the fundamental
ontology of the world consists in point particles moving in space, it is ontologically
necessary for all material objects to be spatially localized. If the fundamental ontology
of the world consists of N permanent point particles, it is ontologically impossible for
any object to be composed of more than N parts. According to a Super-Humean theory
of space or spacetime (Huggett, 2006), it is ontologically possible for spacetime to have
more than four dimensions. According to a functionalist theory of the mind – but not
according to theories that postulate “minds” as ontological primitives – consciousness is
ontologically contingent.
Why should we care about ontological possibility given that it is, as far as I can tell,
a notion that we have just stipulated rather than an established philosophical concept?
Most basically, because it seems like a fairly standard semantic interpretation of what
a hypothesis about the fundamental ontology of the world means. It is thus important
to emphasize that, in this vein, the metaphysical theories themselves determine the class
of “ontological possibilities” as they postulate a fundamental ontology.
Intuitively, because the fundamental entities that we believe to exist should have
a distinguished epistemic and explanatory role over those that are merely possible or
conceivable.
Most importantly, because ontological possibility, thus defined, is the form of modality
that captures the disagreement between Humean and many anti-Humean metaphysics.
Humeans and anti-Humeans will agree on the set of nomological possible worlds (if
they agree on what the best theories of physics are) and they may agree or disagree on
metaphysical possibility for all kinds of philosophical reasons that can go beyond their
stance on laws of nature. Humeans, however, are committed to a principle of unrestricted
recombination (Lewis, 1986a): it is possible to change the configuration of fundamental
entities or properties in any part of the Humean mosaic while holding fix the rest of the
mosaic. This is the positive content of Humean metaphysics, the flip side of the negative
theology regarding necessary connections and other “non-Humean whatnots.”
The main anti-Humean positions, on the other hand, hold that there exists something
in the actual world – be it essential dispositional properties or primitive laws – that
restricts combinations; that makes it impossible, let’s say, for a world to have the same
fundamental ontology as ours but a distribution of masses incompatible with the law of
gravitational attraction. Notably, I consider the relevant ontological commitment to be
a naturalistic one, i.e., a commitment to the fundamental laws that physics discovers in
our universe (and of which, as of today, we have only partial or approximate knowledge).
I don’t believe that anti-Humeanism is interesting as an a priori thesis, postulating the
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existence of some non-Humean laws regardless of their content or connection to empirical
science. Both Humeans and anti-Humeans take a leap of faith when assuming that we
live in a lawful universe, that there are true universal laws that physics can, at least
in principle, discover (or devise). The interesting debate, to my mind, is whether this
justifies, or even compels, ontological commitments over and above the Humean mosaic.
The anti-Humean theories considered here also include the view that the manifesta-
tions of the primitive laws or dispositions are essential to them, i.e., that a particular
non-Humean law is the same in every world in which it exists.5 The different meaning
of “nomological possibility” under a Humean and anti-Humean understanding is thus
manifested in the fact that according to the latter but not the former, ontologically
possible worlds form a subset of the nomologically possible ones.Of course, many anti-
Humean theories go as far as claiming that nomic possibility coincides with metaphysical
possibility, but this is an unnecessarily strong assumption for our purposes.
3 Typicality reasoning and the case against Humeanism
With such a reference class of ontologically possible worlds, typicality can play a similar
role in metaphysics as it does in the physical sciences. Any law-hypothesis in physics
designates a set of nomologically possible worlds. This set must contain the actual world
for the proposed law to have any chance of being true. However, this is not sufficient
for us to judge the law-hypothesis as compelling or explanatory or even empirically
adequate. For instance, there are very plausibly Newtonian universes which are such that
whenever particles are shot through a double slit and recorded on a screen, they form
an interference pattern. These and other quantum phenomena are not made impossible
by Newtonian laws – they just come out as atypical.
On the other hand, whenever we succeed in explaining (macroscopic) phenomena based
on the fundamental (microscopic) laws, we show that they are typical, i.e., obtain for
nearly all6 possible initial micro-conditions, that is, in nearly all nomologically possible
worlds (Lazarovici and Reichert, 2015). Among the typical regularities of our world
are also statistical regularities, which is where objective probabilities come into play
(Maudlin, 2007b; Goldstein, 2012; Oldofredi et al., 2016). If Bohmian mechanics is true,
we even understand why quantum statistics are typical in this sense (Dürr et al., 1992).
5This may not extend to certain parts of the laws, like the constants of nature figuring in their formu-
lation. Typicality considerations then give rise to the issue of fine-tuning of the constants, which is
indeed a big topic in fundamental physics but beyond the scope of our discussion.
6At the suggestion of a referee, I am using “nearly all” for “all except for a subset of very small measure,”
in contrast to “almost all,” which means “all except for a subset of measure zero”.
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The case of the thermodynamic arrow is a particularly interesting and much-discussed
example. It is argued, based on the insights of Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics, that
nearly all possible micro-histories, relative to a low-entropy initial macro-state, corre-
spond to an evolution of increasing entropy (see, e.g., Bricmont (1995); Goldstein (2001);
Lazarovici and Reichert (2015)). However, it is atypical for the universe to be in a low-
entropy state to begin with. This is why we have to invoke an additional theoretical
postulate known as the “Past Hypothesis” (Albert, 2000), and there is a big debate
about whether this Past Hypothesis is of the right kind to be a basic postulate in a
physical theory – even an additional law of nature – or whether it cries out for further
explanation (see, e.g., Penrose (1989, Ch.7); Callender (2004); Carroll (2010); Loewer
(2012); Lazarovici and Reichert (2020)). Notably, without a Past Hypothesis, a typical
universe would look very unordered and chaotic (or utterly boring and unstructured),
even it obeyed simple laws on the microscopic scale.
In general, the way in which we evaluate physical theories is thus roughly the following:
we consider the set of nomologically possible worlds determined by the laws it postulates
and require that the saliant and relevant features of our world – the phenomena which
are the target of explanation – come out as typical (or, at least, not as atypical). If
our world corresponds, in the relevant respects, to an extremely special and fine-tuned,
i.e. atypical, model of the theory, we amend or reject the theory. If we did not follow
this standard, we would lose all means to test a theory against empirical evidence since
special initial conditions could account for virtually anything.
I submit that a similar standard should apply in metaphysics when we judge proposals
for a fundamental ontology of the world. If we want to know what explanatory work a
“metaphysical theory” is doing, and how it matches the world that we live in, we should
consider the set of ontologically possible worlds determined by the fundamental ontology
it postulates and require, at the very least, that the features of our world that fall under
the purview of the proposed metaphysics do not come out as atypical.
While will never get around the problem of underdetermination, this does not mean
that there are no rational standards by which theories about the fundamental ontology
can be judged against the manifest appearance of the world. Typicality provides such a
standard. And if we reject it, we could postulate virtually any ontology we like – as long
as it gives us enough “degrees of freedom” to play around with – and claim that they are
arranged in precisely such as a way as to ground or realize whatever structures we identify
in nature (cf. Lazarovici (2018)). In other words: safe for being logically inconsistent,
both physical and metaphysical theories cannot do any worse in their respective domains
than make the relevant features of our world atypical.
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(What makes a feature of our world “relevant” – a valid target of theoretical expla-
nation rather than an acceptably brute fact – is hard to answer in full generality. Every
world is atypical with respect to some properties, but whether a certain theory is chal-
lenged by them depends also on its scope. In the physical context, the relevant features
usually correspond to robust phenomena. When we consider proposals for the meta-
physics of laws, the existence of laws is clearly a relevant feature of the world that the
theory has to account for.)
Typicality is thus associated with the following rationality principle:
Suppose we accept a theory T and we come to believe that our world has a
salient and relevant property P . If it turns out that P is typical according to
our theory, there is nothing left to explain. If it turns out that P is atypical
according to T , we have to look for additional explanation – or else, in the
least resort, reject our theory.
Atypicality, in other words, creates an epistemically unstable situation, and refusal to
move means, in effect, to give up on a rational understanding of the world. The idea
that our world just happens to be, in some relevant respect, an atypical model of our
theory is unacceptable in science. It seems to me that this rationality principle is so
deeply rooted in scientific thought that it is rarely made explicit, let alone questioned.
As a matter of fact, more authors (see e.g., Putnam (1969)) have questioned the laws of
logic than entertained “explanations” based on atypicality.
Very much related to this is another precedent from science, namely that for typicality
as a necessary condition for a successful reduction. For instance, we accept the reduction
of the thermodynamic theory of gases to the kinetic theory of particles – including the
ontological reduction of gases to particle configurations – because the atomistic theory
makes the relevant gas properties typical.7 Conversely, since special micro-configurations
could realize almost anything, the typicality standard prevents trivial and spurious ac-
counts. Explanations of the form: Assume the initial conditions are such that P , then
P . Or reductions of the form: Assume that X has the right configuration to realize/-
ground/serve as the supervenience base of Y , then we can reduce Y to X. Humean
supervenience has essentially this character: Assuming that the Humean mosaic is ex-
actly as if governed by laws, we can reduce the laws to the mosaic.
7A crucial intermediate result is the Maxwellian velocity distribution, whose derivation, in the words
of Ludwig Boltzmann (1896, p. 252), is based on “the fact that by far the largest number of all
possible states have the characteristic properties of the Maxwellian distribution, and that compared
to this number the amount of possible velocity-distributions that deviate significantly from Maxwell’s
is vanishingly small.”
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In a physical context, we would never accept a reduction based simply on deleting some
theoretical entity and fine-tuning the heck out of what’s left. Why should metaphysicians
be held to that much lower standards?
It is admittedly difficult to find genuine examples for typicality reasoning in meta-
physics that do not rely on natural laws and hence nomic possibilities. However, it is
not too much of a stretch to revisit Leibniz’ monadology, which denied the possibil-
ity of causal interactions between different monads (fundamental substances that can
have either mental or material attributes), and ask: Why did Leibniz have to invoke his
infamous doctrine of pre-established harmony to account for the coordination between
physical and mental states (a form of which David Hume endorsed, as well)? Why could
he not have left every monad to itself and claim that it is a contingent fact of our world
that they happen to evolve in conformity? Well, because this claim is absurd, because
without God’s synchronization and in the absence of any causal or metaphysical connec-
tion, the conformity of mental and physical events would not be merely unexplained but
atypical. Clearly, there would be countless more ways in which the mental and physical
history of the world (and each person individually) could be in discord than in harmony,
and clearly, discord is thus what Leibnizian metaphysics without pre-established har-
mony would imply. (Notably, we can make this judgment with high confidence even
though we have nothing like a “probability measure” over possible mental states.) In
the upshot: because his ontology of monads makes the conformity of mental and phys-
ical events atypical (though not impossible), and because giving up on this conformity
would lead to absurdity or de facto solipsism, Leibniz had to postulate an additional
metaphysical principle, viz. pre-established harmony.
A Humean ontology, as we shall now prove, makes the lawfulness of the world atypical,
the harmony (so to speak) between physical events at different times at places that would
allow for a systematization of the mosaic. As a consequence, we can accept a Humean
ontology and be anti-realists about laws.8 Or we can believe in true universal laws and
look for additional metaphysical principles that account for their existence.
What most advocates of the best system account maintain, however, is that Humean
metaphysics are true, and, at the same time, that our world is an atypical instantiation
of a Humean ontology – not just with respect to some minor detail, but with respect
to its lawfulness, the very feature at the center of their account. And this thesis, as a
matter of reason and scientific practice, cannot be accepted.
8Which is not completely absurd. Maybe Nancy Cartwright (1983) – though no Humean – is right, and
we never had good reasons to believe that laws of nature should be exactly and universally true.
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4 Typical Humean worlds have no laws
In this section, we will prove the main theorem of this paper. In brief: typical Humean
worlds have no laws. We begin with a simple toy model that we call the Chaitin model,
after Gregory Chaitin (2007) who, based on ideas that strike me as very Humean, pro-
posed a connection between scientific practice and algorithmic information theory.
4.1 The Chaitin model
In our model, a world – with the totality of physical facts – is represented by an infinite
sequence of 0’s and 1’s. Assuming a principle of unrestricted recombinations, the set of
ontologically possible Humean worlds thus corresponds to W = {0, 1}N, the set of all
possible sequences.
The Kolmogorov complexity of a sequence w ∈ W is defined as the length of the
shortest algorithm that generates it. If w has finite Kolmogorov complexity, i.e., can be
produced by a finite algorithm, it is called algorithmically compressible.
For instance, the sequence w0 = 0101010101... can be generated by an algorithm like
whi l e True :
p r i n t ( " 0 1 " )
(which is just an infinite loop) so that it is algorithmically compressible with Kolmogorov
complexity of 22 or less.
We can think of an algorithm as a candidate for a best system law, its role being to
provide an efficient summary of the world (i.e., the sequence). In the spirit of the best
system account, the length of the algorithm can be thought of as the measure of its
simplicity. However, our argument will not even require laws to be particularly simple,
they only have to be finite.
One problem, also familiar from the best system account, is that the length of an
algorithm depends on the language in which it is written.9 We will call two languages
L1 and L2 intertranslatable if there exists a finite set of rules translating any algorithm in
L1 into an algorithm in L2, and vice versa. It is easy to check that intertranslatability is
an equivalence relation, and that the Kolmogorov complexity of a sequence with respect
to any two intertranslatable languages differs at most by a finite constant. Algorithmic
compressibility is thus well-defined on these equivalence classes.
It is well known that the best system account would be trivial without some restriction
on the admissible languages in which the systematizations can be formulated. For other-
wise, the best system would simply consist in a primitive predicate F such that F (w) is
9The short example above is written in Python.
13
true if and only if w is the actual world @, see Lewis (1983, p. 367). “Being intertrans-
latable with any language known to humanity” seems like a very generous restriction,
more so than if we assumed a privileged language of perfectly natural predicates.10
Hence, let L be the set of finite algorithms (“possible laws”) in any language inter-
translatable with some language known to humanity, and W ∗ ⊂ W the corresponding
set of compressible sequences. We call any w ∈W ∗ a lawful world.
Now, the following are simple mathematical facts:
• The set W of possible sequences (“possible Humean worlds”) is uncountably infi-
nite, its cardinality being that of the continuum: |W | = 2ℵ0 > ℵ0.
• The set L is countably infinite: |L| = ℵ0. [There are at most countably many
admissible languages and countably many finite algorithms that can be formulated
in each language. A countable union of countable sets is countable.]
• The set of compressible sequences (“lawful worlds”) cannot be greater than the set
of possible algorithms (“laws”): |W ∗| ≤ |L| = ℵ0. [Since each algorithm generates
at most one sequence.]
• We conclude: |W
∗|
|W | = 0. Hence, almost all sequences are algorithmically incom-
pressible. Or: Almost all Humean world have no laws.
As in our first example of irrational numbers, we could also express typicality in terms of
a measure instead of cardinalities. It then holds true that µ(W ∗ ⊂W ) = 0 with respect
to all measures on W that are zero on singletons. In the upshot, “lawfulness” is atypical
among Humean worlds under any reasonable interpretation of the concept.
4.2 From the toy model to the real world
While I hope the model to be instructive, the real world is evidently not a sequence of
numbers, and fundamental laws of nature are not just algorithms for data compression
but, first and foremost, dynamical laws for the microscopic constituents of the world.
In order to extend our previous result to realistic physical laws – focusing, for now, on
deterministic ones – we proceed as follows:
We fix a slice V of the mosaic, which is sufficiently extended in space and time to fix
not just initial conditions for any deterministic dynamics, but also the values of all free
parameters, like constants of nature, that may appear in their formulation. (V could
10Correspondingly, in our toy-model, we could have defined compressibility with respect to a universal
Turing machine.
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be the actual history of our universe up to some time t, but a great many other choices
will do, as well.) Then there exist at most countably many deterministic laws (if any)
compatible with the facts in V – each determining a unique history for the rest of the
universe – but uncountably many Humean possibilities to complete the mosaic.
Hence, we conclude that whatever the facts in V , it is atypical for the rest of the
Humean mosaic to be consistent with any deterministic law (formulated in any language,
formal or natural, that we could ever hope to understand).
As a corollary, we obtain: Given any deterministic law that can correctly describe the
world up to time t, Humeanism implies that it will typically fail to be true at later times.
This supports and strengthens the argument that Humeanism cannot sustain inductive
inferences (Dretske, 1977; Armstrong, 1983; Segal, 2020). Induction may be difficult to
justify in general, but Humean metaphysics predicts its failure in this sense.
While this (a)typicality result seems serious enough, it is, strictly speaking, a condi-
tional claim “given one part of the mosaic.” In general, there are already uncountably
many possibilities for the “initial” data, i.e., uncountably many worlds consistent with
every single deterministic law. At this point, we need some measure theory, after all, to
obtain an unconditional typicality result.
As always, we assume that one-element subsets (and hence, by σ-additivity, countable
subsets) of an uncountable set have measure zero. In addition, we require only that this
remains true if we conditionalize on the configuration of the Humean mosaic in V and
count the possible configurations in some distant region U . This is certainly legitimate
considering the Humean principle of free combinations, which holds that one puts no
restrictions on the other. (In fact, we assume much less than completely independent
configurations in all disjoint spacetime regions, requiring only some region U whose
possible configurations are not strongly restricted by that in V .)
The proof, given in the appendix, involves one technical subtlety (because we are
potentially conditioning on a null-set), but in a nutshell, the argument concludes as
follows: Denote by wU the configuration of the mosaic in a spacetime region U . Then,
there are uncountably many possible configurations wU but, by the previous argument, at
most countably many consistent with a deterministic law and the “boundary condition”
wV . Hence, µ(wU consistent with a law |wV ) ≡ 0 (for some suitable choice of U and V )
and thus, with W ∗ the set of lawful Humean worlds,
µ(W ∗) ≤
∫
µ(wU consistent with a law |wV ) dµ(wV ) = 0
according to any reasonable measure. We conclude:
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Theorem 4.1. It is atypical for Humean worlds to be consistent with a deterministic
systematization.
Remark. This remains true if one restricts the set of possible Humean worlds to those
consistent with intelligent life (in an attempt to appeal to anthropic arguments), or
any other boundary conditions that one could impose on empirical grounds. A typical
Humean world would still not be more regular than necessary to account for these
conditions – which would, at most, require a small island of regularity in otherwise
lawless universe.11
4.2.1 On typicality measures
Admittedly, the notion of a “reasonable measure” is doing a lot of work here. Mathe-
matically, it is certainly possible to define other measures, but these are so clearly biased
or ad hoc that they cannot play the role of a typicality measure. Mathematically, it is
also possible to put a delta-measure on the reals and say that “almost all real numbers
are zero.” But this statement would only be true in the technical sense in which the
locution “almost all” is introduced in measure theory. In any other sense, it is simply
an abuse of language.
The point is that typicality statements have rational (normative) implications if and
only if they are made with respect to a reasonable notion of “almost all.” And I claim
that the assumptions of our theorem are so weak and well-motivated that they exhaust
all measures that could pass for reasonable. It is thereby important to keep in mind
that, in contrast to other publications aiming at a similar conclusion, we are not arguing
for some assignment of probabilities or a priori believes, but only for a sensible notion of
“very large” versus “very small” sets of possible worlds (on which a huge class of measures
will, in fact, agree). And to reject our notion is either to deny that a one-element subset
is vanishingly small compared to an uncountably infinite set – which seems absurd – or
to presuppose extremely strong “correlations” between different parts of the mosaic –
which means, in effect, to deny Humeanism.
That said, the most common objection I have received remains that Humeans could
reject all measures as unjustified – pointing, again, to the lack of an empirical basis for
quantifying possible Humean worlds. But is it really an empirical fact that one out of
an (uncountable) infinitude is almost none? And is it not a tenet of Humeanism itself
that, ontologically, the configuration in one part of the mosaic does not restrict the rest?
11The situation here is quite analogous to the so-called “Boltzmann brain problem” in statistical me-
chanics (absent a Past Hypothesis).
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It thus remains unclear to me what premise they could deny, and I suspect that this
objection fails to appreciate the different between typicality and probability.
Maybe what some Humeans actually want to deny is not the typicality fact per se
but its epistemic/doxastic implications, i.e., the rationality principles associated with
typicality facts. Here, this would simply mean to insist that it is not irrational to believe
in a certain metaphysical theory of laws, and, at the same time, that our world is unlike
almost every model of that theory by having laws in the first place. In this case, we
may not be able to settle the issue, although I will say a little more about it in the
final section. But we would have at least succeeded in tracing back a key disagreement
between many Humeans and anti-Humeans to the rejection/acceptance of a particular
way of reasoning.
4.3 Finite systematizations
Our proof that the existence of a deterministic systematization is atypical for Humean
worlds relied on the assumption that there are uncountably many possible configurations
of the mosaic, or an infinite number of physical facts that the laws have to account for. On
what basis could this assumption be denied? One could insist that the world is finitary,
i.e., that space and time are finite and discrete, and that there are no continuous degrees
of freedom in the physical ontology. While this cannot be ruled out in principle, it
constitutes a rather strong a priori commitment and a revisionary stance with respect to
contemporary physics. Alternatively, one could maintain that laws of nature do not have
to provide a complete (microscopic) description of the world but only an approximate or
“coarse-grained” systematization of a limited subset of events – e.g., measurement results
or empirical observations – that is plausibly finite. This second option is essentially
instrumentalism; the view that laws are efficient bookkeepers of empirical data rather
than universal truths about the world.
In any case, if laws had to account only for a finite number of physical facts, it would
still be true that typical Humean worlds are more or less irreducibly complex – meaning
that they cannot be systematized by laws that are significantly simpler than a complete
list of the relevant events – but only with respect to a more restricted set of languages
in which the systems can be formulated. (Think about the Chaitin model and the
question whether the Kolmogorov complexity of a finite sequence is significantly lower
than the length of that sequence.) One could thus retreat to the idea that the order in
our universe is not objective, but that (instrumentalist) laws – and the regular patterns
they summarize – exist because we have adapted our cognitive and mathematical tools
to the world that we inhabit (see e.g., Wenmackers (2016)).
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Although I find it very uncompelling, I am not going to argue against this possi-
ble escape. If one concedes that Humeanism is de facto instrumentalism – or requires
revisionary physics –the whole debate would be a very different one.
4.4 Indeterministic Laws
The issue becomes more complicated if we consider the possibility of indeterministic
laws. Logically, at least, an indeterministic law (e.g., a stochastic evolution) could be
compatible with any mosaic whatsoever – that is, unless there are real propensities in
the world that the law is supposed to summarize. In fact, there is even a good case
to be made that typical Humean worlds are well described by something like Brownian
motion, which can be technically considered a “law” but describes pure noise rather than
any kind of regular order.
For a probabilistic law to be informative, and allow for something akin to causal
inferences, it must predict reasonably high conditional probabilities for a relevant class
of events (Lewis (1980) talked, in particular, about “history to chance conditionals”),
that is, expressions of the form P(A | B) ≈ 1 where the conditional probability for A
depends non-trivially on B. In our world, the history of the universe up to the present
time t should make it reasonably likely that the earth will still be in its solar orbit 10
seconds from now. Kicking a ball from the left/right should make it reasonably likely that
the ball flies off to the right/left. More generally speaking, a concentration of masses in
a small spacetime region B might make it very likely that masses agglomerate in another
region A, or something like that. All laws, or law-candidates, that we take seriously in
physics allow for such inferences (at least in relevant “semi-classical” situations).12
Now, could such correlations be typical with respect to Humean ontological possi-
bilities? I claim that they can not. For if we take Humean metaphysics seriously, the
possible configurations in one part of the mosaic should be independent of the facts in
any other part of the mosaic. In effect, any evidence for a robust correlation is evidence
that we do not live in a typical Humean world. And the existence of infinitely many cor-
related events would certainly be atypical with respect to Humean possibilities (while, if
there is only a limited number of events that a law has to account for, we are essentially
back in the “instrumentalist” scenario discussed in the previous subsection).
This is, admittedly, a less rigorous argument than the one for deterministic laws. And
the result is weaker, as well, relying on a distinction between “informative” and “non-
informative” laws that would warrant further elaboration, and on typicality measures
12The same applies, in effect, if one has a more deflationary conception of laws, according to which even
the fundamental laws of physics can allow for exceptions or ceteris paribus clauses.
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with strong independence properties. In the Chaitin model, it is also true that typical
sequences do not allow for a more informative probabilistic systematization than “The
next number in the sequence is 0 or 1 with a 50/50 chance” – but only with respect
to a more restricted (though very natural) class of typicality measures (namely those
that are absolutely continuous relative to the uniform measure when the set of possible
sequences W is embedded into the real interval [0, 1]).
That said, at the end of the day, I don’t expect the contentious point of our discussion
to be whether Humean metaphysics fares much better with respect to probabilistic laws
than deterministic ones. As with instrumentalism (or maybe even more so), committing
to indeterminism from the get-go does not seem like an attractive option that most
Humeans would want to take.
5 On the uniformity of nature
It would seem unreasonable ... if the whole universe and each and every part
of it were in order..., while there were nothing of the kind in the principles.
— Theophrastus, Metaphysics 7a10
With the caveats just discussed, I consider it a fact that almost all Humean worlds
have no laws. The philosophically more subtle discussion happened in Section 3, where
we argued for the normative implications of typicality facts.
I take it that any form of rationality is normative. At the same time, I see one of
the weaknesses of probabilistic arguments in that they try to shortcut the issue and
argue directly in epistemic or doxastic terms. Typicality facts are neither epistemic nor
doxastic facts. They hold independently of what we know or believe. Yet, they have
implications for what we should rationally believe, or accept, or seek to explain. In
the present case, that we cannot accept Humean metaphysics and believe in a lawful
universe without seeking explanation for its lawfulness.
On the other hand, the account provided by anti-Humean theories is not a bona fide
typicality explanation in that non-Humean laws make their instantiation not just typical
but necessary. (This is strictly stronger, necessity implies typicality but not the other
way around). The primary role of typicality in our argument is thus not to sustain
an explanation but to establish that one is required, that the price for declaring the
history of the universe to be entirely contingent is unreasonably high. However, what
applies here as well as to bona fide typicality explanations is that they do not have to
involve an interesting “mechanism” by which the explanandum comes about. There is
no interesting story left to tell about how laws govern or how dispositions bring about
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their manifestation; the point is that they are a natural part of an ontology that doesn’t
make the existence of regularities in the world miraculous.
Typicality reasoning thus reveals how the explanatory virtue of an anti-Humean ontol-
ogy comes from its modal force, from the way in which it restricts ontological possibilities.
In contrast, the idea that non-Humean laws fare better in explaining their particular in-
stances has made them vulnerable to the virtus dormitiva objection that any explanation
they provide over and above the regularity theory is trivial or circular: Why do masses
attract each other? Because they have the disposition to attract each other. Or: be-
cause it is a law that masses attract each other. In the contemporary literature (see,
e.g., Emery (2019)), such statements are often spelled out in terms of grounding rela-
tions or as “in virtue of” explanations, which makes them manifestly non-circular, but
still ring hollow to people not already sold on the merits of these metaphysical concepts.
Thinking in terms of typicality, one appreciates that the real explanatory advantage
of non-Humean laws is not that they provide an additional metaphysical ground for
individual instances, but that they account for the world being lawful in the first place.
At the end of the day, one can only go so far in compelling someone to accept a
certain way of reasoning and the norms that come with it. Some readers may deny that
typicality facts have any philosophical implications, that there is even a sense in which
Humean metaphysics make the lawfulness of our world surprising or remarkable. But
there is no shame in sharing, at least, in a sense of wonder about the order of our cosmos.
(After all, according to Aristotle, the sense of wonder is the beginning of philosophy.)
The following passage from one of Albert Einstein’s letters to his friend Maurice Solovine
comes to mind:
You find it strange that I consider the comprehensibility of the world (to
the extent that we are authorized to speak of such a comprehensibility) as a
miracle or as an eternal mystery. Well, a priori one should expect a chaotic
world which cannot be grasped by the mind in any way. One could (yes
one should) expect the world to be subjected to law only to the extent that
we order it through our intelligence. Ordering of this kind would be like
the alphabetical ordering of the words of a language. By contrast, the kind
of order created by Newton’s theory of gravitation, for instance, is wholly
different. Even if the axioms of the theory are proposed by man, the success
of such a project presupposes a high degree of ordering of the objective world,
and this could not be expected a priori. That is the “miracle” which is being
constantly reinforced as our knowledge expands. There lies the weakness
of positivists and professional atheists who are elated because they feel that
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they have not only successfully rid the world of gods but “bared the miracles.”
(Cited from Einstein (1987, pp. 132-133).)
What, to their credit, distinguishes most Humeans from the “positivists and professional
atheists” that Einstein is talking about, is some acknowledgement that the best system
account of laws has to rely on nature being “kind to us” (Lewis, 1994, p. 479), on “a high
degree of ordering of the objective world” that cannot be expected a priori. However, this
kindness of nature is so stupendous and doing so much work in the best system account
that it is highly unsatisfying, if not intellectually dishonest, to leave it as a footnote
or some sort of auxiliary assumption without any basis in the metaphysical theory. If
Humeans tried to give it more flesh, and spell it out as a metaphysical principle that
makes the uniformity of the world typical (or necessary), their account would be much
more sound but also start to look a lot more like anti-Humeanism.
One the other hand, some authors have argued that anti-Humean metaphysics have
no advantage when it comes to explaining the uniformity of nature (Hildebrand, 2013).
In this vein, advocates of the regularity theory could admit that Humeanism fails to
account for a lawful universe but deny that anti-Humean positions fare any better in
this respect. In the language of typicality, the relevant argument goes roughly as follows:
“Even if our world contained primitive laws or dispositions that necessitate reasonably
simple regularities, this very fact would be atypical, as well. In almost all worlds in
which non-Humean laws exist, the laws would be too strange or complex to allow for
any meaningful systematization. Hence, the typicality argument can be turned just as
well against anti-Humean metaphysics.”
I am not sure whether this typicality statement is actually true. At least, most anti-
Humean theories do not entail the possibility of arbitrarily complex laws in the same
sense in which Humean metaphysics entails the possibility of arbitrarily complex mosaics.
Note that if we change the configuration of a lawful Humean mosaic only slightly (that
is, in a small spacetime region, not with respect to a Humean similarity relation between
worlds that seeks to hold the laws fix by fiat) it will, in general, no longer be a lawful
mosaic. If we change a simple law only slightly, it will still be a simple law. The point is
that the degrees of freedom of a law are clearly different from those of the world, and the
question what metaphysical possibilities we must admit with respect to the type “law
of nature” strikes me as a very difficult one. Hildebrand (2013) takes nomic primitivism
to mean that there exists a primitive lawhood operator “It is a law that...” that can
attach to any proposition P , no matter how gruesome or unnatural. But this is not how
physical theories actually look like, or what the anti-Humean positions that we regarded
as promising actually commit to.
21
But even if we grant that typical non-Humean worlds have no simple laws, it is crucial
to note that this is a typicality statement with respect to a different reference class than
we employed in our discussion; namely metaphysically possible worlds (under a liberal
interpretation of metaphysical possibility) rather than what we called ontologically pos-
sible worlds (across which the fundamental entities and their essential properties are
constant). It is thereby shifting the debate from ontology to meta-ontology, from the
question: “What is the fundamental ontology of our world (and does it contain the laws
of nature)?” to: “Why is the fundamental ontology (here, specifically, the laws) what
it is?”. It is much less clear that this is a good and tractable question, and it is, in any
case, not the question we set out to debate.13
The following analogy may help to illustrate my point: If all matter propagates along
three spatial dimensions (not just appears to, but actually does), it is more than rea-
sonable to infer that space – or the fundamental spatial relations, if one pefers, – are
three-dimensional. (It would possible, yet atypical, that space has more dimensions,
while all physical motion happens to occur along a three-dimensional subspace.) But
why has space three dimensions when it could, at least mathematically, have had arbi-
trarily many? I don’t know, and this was not the issue. If its three-dimensionality is
part of my fundamental ontological commitments, then precisely because I can’t reduce
it to anything more fundamental.
As emphasized before, the aim of our discussion was not to defend anti-Humeanism
as an a priori thesis. No one, I think, holds the view that our world must contain
some primitive laws or dispositions, even if they govern only the growth of beetroots,
or account for no meaningful regularities at all. My belief in non-Humean laws is very
much contingent on the success of the scientific enterprise. And if I wake up tomorrow
and find that the law of gravitation no longer holds, I would float through the air and
admit that Humeanism was probably right all along.
Certainly, anti-Humean metaphysics do not relieve us of wonder and amazement about
the simple and elegant laws that we discover in our universe. The existence of something
over and above the Humean mosaic is, instead, an ontological conclusion that we draw
from this discovery – with good reason as this paper has argued in detail. That may be
as far as we can go. However, if there were a promising chance to take the explanation
one step further, to understand why the laws are what they are, we should, by all means,
follow the evidence where it leads us. It could, in any case, lead us only further away
from Humeanism.
13It might be worth exploring the idea of meta-laws that constrain the possible non-Humean laws (Lange,
2009), but this goes beyond the scope of this paper and one must worry that it would, at best, be
passing the buck (for what explains or necessitates the meta-laws?).
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Appendix: Proof of the main theorem
Theorem. It is atypical for Humean worlds to be consistent with any deterministic
systematization.
Proof. Let’s assume, with David Lewis, that the fundamental ontology is one of “per-
fectly natural properties” instantiated at spacetime points. (The argument for other
ontologies, e.g., continuous particle trajectories, will go more or less analogously.) We
can then model the set of possible Humean worlds by W := {w :M→ S ⊂ Rn}, where
M is the spacetime manifold and the “field values” w(x) describe the magnitudes of the
relevant properties at spacetime point x.
We denote by wV the restriction of w to V ⊂ M for a suitable V as explained in
Section 4.2 (wV is “the configuration of the mosaic in V ”) and by LU [f ] the possible
configurations of the mosaic in U ⊂M that are consistent with some deterministic law
and the boundary condition wV = f . By the argument given in Section 4.2, LU [f ] is
at most countable for any f : V → S, and for any U ⊆ M \ V , the set W ∗ of Humean
worlds consistent with a deterministic law must be contained in {w ∈ LU [wV ]} ⊂W .
Now, we choose as U a collection of points in M \ V ; countably infinitely many
points if S is discrete, and finitely many if S is continuous. In any case, there are
uncountably many possible configurations on U (but at most countably many consistent
with a deterministic law and given boundary conditions on V ). Let µ be a normalized
measure on W (more precisely, on a suitable σ-algebra). Then there exists a regular
version of µ (w(U) ∈ · |wV ), i.e., a well-defined measure on the possible configurations in
U , even if we conditionalized on a null-set. This holds because the value space of wU ,
viz. S|U |, is isomorphic to some subspace of Rk, k ∈ N ∪ {∞} (Ash and Doleans-Dade,
2000, Thm. 5.6.5). By assumption, this conditional measure has no discrete part (for
at least some suitable choices of U and V ), i.e., it is zero on singletons, and thus by
σ-additivity also on countable sets. Hence, µ(wU ∈ LU [wV ] | wV ) ≡ 0. Therefore,
µ(W ∗) ≤
∫
µ(wU ∈ LU [wV ] | wV ) dµ(wV ) = 0. (1)
The proof extends at least to σ-finite measures with the conditional “probability” re-
placed by a Radon-Nikodym density (Ash and Doleans-Dade, 2000, Thm. 2.2.1).
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